Conrad's Neuroplasticity by Lawtoo, Nidesh
Conrad’s Neuroplasticity
Nidesh Lawtoo
Modernism/modernity, Volume 23, Number 4, November 2016, pp. 771-788
(Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI:
For additional information about this article
Access provided by JHU Libraries (2 Jan 2017 09:27 GMT)
https://doi.org/10.1353/mod.2016.0073
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/643187
Nidesh Lawtoo is a 
Swiss National Science 
Foundation Visiting 
Scholar in the Humani-
ties Center at Johns 
Hopkins University. He 
is the editor of Conrad’s 
“Heart of Darkness” and 
Contemporary Thought 
(2012) and the author 
of two monographs: The 
Phantom of the Ego: Mod-
ernism and the Mimetic 
Unconscious (2013), 
and Conrad’s Shadow: 
Catastrophe, Mimesis, 
Theory (2016). His next 




The brain is a work, and we do not know it. We are its 
subjects—authors and products at once—and we do 
not know it.
—Catherine Malabou, What Should 
We Do with Our Brain?1
[I]t is only through an unremitting never-discouraged 
care for the shape and ring of sentences that an ap-
proach can be made to plasticity. 
 —Joseph Conrad, “Preface” to  
 The Nigger of the “Narcissus” (1897)2
Nothing seems to escape the neuro turn. Not content with 
neurology, neuropsychology, and neuropsychiatry, the neurosci-
ences are now infiltrating the humanities as well. There is now 
talk of neurophilosophy, neuroanthropology, neuroethics—even 
God is approached from the angle of neurotheology. It is thus 
not surprising that an adaptable field such as literary studies is 
currently being transformed by what goes under the rubric of 
neuroaesthetics. This enthusiastic outbreak of neuromania is 
contagious and seductive, but it can also be perceived as mad-
dening and reductive. And rightly so, for the oxymoronic con-
nection between aesthetics and the neurons that fire in the brain 
risks not only to infect the art of interpretation but also to kill 
the very soul of the subject matter it sets out to dissect. And yet, 
recent developments on both sides of the science/humanities 
divide strongly suggest that the binary between these compet-
ing perspectives may not be as polarized as it appears to be and 
that a productive dialogue can potentially emerge as these “two 
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772 cultures” face, confront, and reflect on each other—provided they do not attempt to 
mirror one another.3
As Paul Armstrong puts it in How Literature Plays with the Brain, “What the hu-
manities have most to gain from . . . [t]aking up conversations with the neuroscientific 
community about matters of mutual interest” is nothing less “than a recovery of our 
disciplinary identity” (10). In this article, I would like to follow up on this hypothesis 
by turning to the literary case of Joseph Conrad, a modernist author who made the 
discovery of his own identity his primary subject of aesthetic exploration and, by doing 
so, provided influential case studies for articulating the protean identities of literary 
studies in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. I suggest that the neurosciences 
paradoxically confirm a point theorists in the humanities have been making all along: they 
emphasize the dominant role played by culture, history, and language—not nature—in 
the formation, deformation, and transformation of subjectivity.
Recent discoveries in the neurosciences have established that our brain is far more 
malleable than previously realized and, as a consequence, is continuously molded by 
cultural impressions throughout our entire lives. It is not simply that our mind is shaped 
by external, social influences that inform the content of what we think—that we long 
knew. Rather, it is the structure of the brain itself, in its synaptic, neuronal connections 
that has the capacity to change over time, reforming the very medium through which 
we think. As Norman Doidge puts it, “the brain can change its own structure and func-
tion through thought and activity.”4 This is good news for patients suffering from brain 
damage that was previously considered irreversible, such as post-stroke paralysis and 
phantom limbs. It is also good news for fields that are currently going through precarious 
and vulnerable times, like the humanities in general and literary studies in particular. 
Scholars in the humanities informed by critical theory are well positioned to absorb the 
implications of such models of plasticity, adaptability, resilience, and self-improvement. 
Far from wiring subjectivity in a fixed, immutable, biological essence, the neuroplastic 
revolution paradoxically contributes to moving us away from essentialist assumptions 
about what human nature is, or should be. It also encourages unreconstructed human-
ists to take an active stance in the formation of who we would like to become. This is, 
at least, what French philosopher Catherine Malabou suggests when she writes: “The 
brain is a work, and we do not know it. We are its subjects—authors and products at 
once—and we do not know it” (What Should We Do, 1).
My hypothesis in what follows is that Conrad knew it. And as the author—subject and 
product at once—of fictions that represent plastic characters, he wanted his readers to 
know it as well. An orphan driven into an impressive process of cultural adaptation that 
took him across different continents, languages, and professional identities, Conrad was 
particularly well placed to feel the power of cultural impressions on his plastic brain. 
And as a modernist artist concerned with malleable fictional characters embarked on 
journeys of self-transformation, he could give artistic form to these impressions in fic-
tions that admittedly aspired to the “plasticity of sculpture” (“Preface,” xiii). A plastic, 
adaptable subject turned into an artist with plastic aspirations: this condensed picture 
of Conrad’s metamorphosis already reveals, in a nutshell, the double, paradoxical struc-
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773ture of plasticity itself. As Malabou explains, “the word plasticity has two basic senses: it 
means at once the capacity to receive form (clay is called ‘plastic’ for example) and the 
capacity to give form (as in the plastic arts)” (What Should We Do, 5). In what follows, 
I argue that the two faces of plasticity Malabou delineates conceptually, Conrad repre-
sents—or, better, sculpts—artistically. In the process, he makes us see that plasticity is 
the very medium that turned the formative impressions recorded in his memoirs into 
impressionistic forms traced in his fictions. There is, in fact, a sense in which, for both 
the philosopher and the artist, plasticity is a double-faced concept that is as much on 
the side of life as on the side of art, passivity as activity, subject formation as aesthetic 
(trans)formation. As the source of both good and bad impressions, psychic formations 
and aesthetic representations, subjection to cultural models and creation of fictional 
types, passive adaptation and active transformation, plasticity requires a Janus-faced 
approach in order to be adequately represented.
And yet, in another, perhaps deeper sense, the artist does not simply represent, 
shadow-like, a conceptual form initially conceived by a philosopher; he also provides 
an artistic supplement to our understanding of plasticity as an emerging conceptual 
protagonist on the modernist stage. Conrad is, of course, not a philosopher primarily 
concerned with “ideas,” nor a scientist concerns with “facts.” He is, rather, an “artist” 
who, as he says in the “Preface” to The Nigger of the “Narcissus,” “seeks the truth” by 
appealing to what he calls, “our less obvious capacities” (“Preface,” xi–xii).5 Less obvious 
and less visible, these capacities are no less profound and illuminating. In particular, 
the artist makes us see what neither scientists nor philosophers have yet recognized. 
Namely, that as a concept, plasticity follows, shadow-like, the paradoxical formative, 
deformative, and transformative power of what the ancients used to call—somewhat 
enigmatically—mimesis. Furthering my previous work on the role the mimetic uncon-
scious plays in the (de)formation of the modern ego, and building on philosophical 
accounts of mimesis that are not restricted to realist aesthetics, I turn to Conrad as a 
source of literary inspiration to theorize the aesthetic and conceptual foundations of 
plasticity on new—or, rather, ancient—ground.6 I argue that Conrad’s Under Western 
Eyes (1911) and his autobiographical memoir, A Personal Record (1912) are two texts 
that benefit from being reread in tandem not only because they were written during the 
same period and deal with the formation of Conrad’s personal and literary identity, but 
also, and for us more importantly, because they each provide one face of the two sides 
of Conrad’s neuroplasticity at play in his art and life.7 In particular, both texts are liter-
ally inscribed in a long philosophical tradition that—from Plato to Rousseau, Derrida to 
Lacoue-Labarthe—reveals that plasticity, in its conceptual structure, material effects, 
and aesthetic formations, reproduces, shadow-like, the paradoxical duplicity of mimesis 
in both its power to receive (good and bad) impressions and to give artistic form to them.
My claim is that this protean concept understood not as homogeneous realistic 
imitation but in its heterogeneous theoretical manifestations—including aesthetic re-
presentation, psychic adaptation, and neurological transformation—in-forms (gives 
form to) Conrad’s impressionistic poetics. And conversely, this poetics casts new light on 
some of the conceptual paradoxes that have been central to poststructuralist accounts 
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the rubric of plasticity. A diagnostic account of the plasticity of mimesis, as we shall 
see, is sharpened by adopting philosophical, psychological, and aesthetic lenses that 
are attentive to the complex, spiraling effect that turns psychosomatic (dis)figurations 
into aesthetic re-presentations, and vice versa. In the process, a mimetic approach to 
plasticity goes beyond structural, dualistic oppositions in order to think through the 
relation that connects nature and culture, the mind and the brain, psyche and soma, 
subject formation and artistic formation, along lines that reinscribe neuroplasticity 
within the paradoxical structure of what was once called mimesis.
To be sure, Conrad does not provide us with hard, scientific facts or immutable 
philosophical ideas that would answer, once and for all, the question “what should we 
do with our brain?” Yet, as he puts his brain to work in an effort of “conver[ting] nervous 
force into phrases,” he can help us address theoretical paradoxes that are now haunt-
ing philosophers and scientists as well.8 Above all, Conrad’s experiential and artistic 
reframing of neuroplasticity in his personal records and confessional fictions provides 
a diagnostic that gives affective and conceptual substance to the ongoing dialogue 
between literature and science.
Personal Records: A Plastic Character
For Conrad, plasticity was not an abstract idea, but a matter of lived experience, not 
a philosophical or scientific hypothesis, but a formative part of his artistic practice. As he 
moved from Poland to France in his mid-teens, switching from Polish to French, while 
embarking on an improbable career as a seaman that took him across the world—around 
Cape Horn toward India and Malaysia and back, with decisive stops in Mauritius and 
the Congo—switching to English mid-route, while working his way up from steward to 
second mate, first mate to captain, only to switch, once again, in his mid-thirties to start 
an even more improbable literary career in a new country, in his third language—as he 
struggled through such perilous maneuvers, Conrad did not simply wonder about what 
he should do with his brain. He actually relied on its plasticity to do something with it.9
This, at least, is what he avows in his autobiographical memoir, A Personal Record 
(1912), as he looks back to meditate on his improbable transition from master mariner 
to master of English prose. It is, in fact, in the context of a discussion of his multiple, 
protean transformations that Conrad speculates about what he calls his “still plastic 
character.”10 This is an incisive, self-diagnostic phrase whose affective, conceptual, and 
artistic contours it will be our task to delineate in what follows. Taken out of context, 
it already encapsulates the essential: that the “still plastic” disposition of what Conrad 
calls here “character” functions as the material base, the malleable substance, perhaps 
even the artistic medium to navigate this delicate transition from a life at sea to one at a 
writing desk. Conrad is talking about his own personal plasticity here, and I will return 
to A Personal Record in the second part of this article. But since this claim appears in 
the context of his linguistic adoption of the English language he uses as a “medium 
of expression,” it is important to stress at the outset that—as a “writer of imaginative 
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characters who are not already in possession of fixed, hardwired identities, but are always 
open to formative experiences that render them pliable to external impressions (5, 89).
Consistently in his novels, Conrad thinks of his literary characters as formless, mal-
leable, and adaptable figures who are relational in nature, affective in disposition, and 
chameleon-like in their mimetic faculties. From the crowd psychology at the center of 
The Nigger of the “Narcissus” to the psychic phantoms that haunt Heart of Darkness 
(1899), from the protean identifications that inform Lord Jim (1900) to the figure of 
the homo duplex animating “The Secret Sharer” (1912) and The Shadow-Line (1917), 
the shadow of mimesis often falls on Conrad’s fictions outlining a subject that is con-
tinuously shaped by impressions that are as physical as they are psychic, as exterior as 
they are interior.11 But it is perhaps in Under Western Eyes (1911)—a confessional 
political novel whose writing literally made a serious dent in the author’s neurological 
system, causing a severe physical and mental breakdown that threatened the stability 
of his “still plastic character”—that Conrad goes furthest in his diagnostic account of 
plastic (dis)figuration.
Traces of (Dis)Figuration: The Case of Razumov Reopened
That plasticity is central to the affective and conceptual delineation of Under Western 
Eyes’s protagonist is clear from the outset. Kirylo Sidorovitch Razumov, the tragic hero 
of this Russian tale—a student of philosophy unwittingly implicated in a revolutionary 
bombing that targets an oppressive minister of state—is immediately defined in terms 
of a disarming malleability that, in a figurative but also material sense, already seals 
his tragic destination. The narrator introduces Razumov as a “tall, well-proportioned 
young man” whose “good looks would have been unquestionable if it had not been for 
a peculiar lack of fineness in the features.”12 And going below the aesthetic surface of 
his physical appearance, he cuts deep into the psychic substance of Razumov’s charac-
ter as he specifies: “It was as if a face modelled vigorously in wax (with some approach 
even to a classical correctness of type) had been held close to a fire till all sharpness 
of line had been lost in the softening of the material” (Conrad, Under Western Eyes, 
13). What Conrad represents or, rather, sculpts—with the narrator as a chisel—is not 
simply an impressionistic picture of the protagonist’s malleable face; it is above all a 
psychosomatic delineation of the plastic foundations of an impressionable, wax-like 
character whose process of psychic (dis)figuration the novel will subsequently outline.
We shall soon confirm that this picture of a malleable subject should be taken liter-
ally, for it looks ahead to accounts of the plasticity of the human brain (a term Conrad 
uses). But let us first recall that it also looks back to an ancient philosophical account 
of character—at least if we understand character in its classical definition (from Greek, 
kharakter, engraved mark, imprint on the soul, but also instrument for marking). This 
picture of Razumov, in fact, reminds us that plasticity is far from being a new concept. 
And as Conrad sets out to delineate the process of impression of a wax-like character, 
who is also a “third year’s student in philosophy,” strolling up and down a famous road 
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back to the philosophical foundations of plasticity that, in a way, already pave the way 
for contemporary accounts of neuroplasticity (13).
In his representation of fictional characters in general and of Razumov’s psychic life 
in particular, Conrad relies on an ancient conception of human character in order to 
outline the double effects of external impressions. This passage, in fact, reveals that 
plasticity is a Janus-faced concept: on the one hand, plasticity functions as a malleable, 
material base that can potentially be fashioned in a beautiful form cast from a “classi-
cal type”; on the other hand, it works as a wax-like material that can be “melted” in a 
formless figure. A plastic character can thus simultaneously be the subject of an artistic 
figuration and the object of a psychic disfiguration. Good and bad impressions, active 
and passive imprints, artistic formation and psychic deformation: Conrad’s view of 
plasticity could not be more classical.
Lest we hastily proclaim as a scientific discovery what a third-year student of phi-
losophy should recognize as a revolutionary empirical confirmation of philosophical and 
literary insights that go to the very foundations of the humanities, a theoretical reminder 
is in order. Conrad’s aesthetic emphasis on appearance, proportion, delineation, and 
the language of sculpture that informs this characterization is indeed “classical” in the 
sense that it goes all the way back to ancient Greece, to that locus classicus of mimetic 
theory, which is Plato’s Republic. In particular, Conrad echoes an idealist view of beauty 
that values aesthetic figures on the basis of an imitation of ideal “types,” “models,” or 
“forms.” As Plato puts it, in book 10 of the Republic, the craftsman “fixes his eyes on 
the idea or form” so as to reproduce a phenomenal copy, phantom, or shadow which, 
at one additional remove, mimetic artists will subsequently re-produce (produce again, 
for the second time), generating shadows of shadows. As Conrad speaks of “modelling” 
a material so as to “approach even to a classical correctness of type,” he is thus not 
only invoking an idealist conception of beauty; he is also relying on a classical view of 
creation that considers artistic figures to be modeled on ideal types. Conrad’s impres-
sionistic representation of Razumov’s character suggests that mimesis continues to be 
the medium through which ideal, artistic types can be formed.13
And yet, mimesis is not only implicitly part of the medium of Conrad’s literary 
characterization; it also explicitly informs the psychological message of the tale itself. 
Razumov, in fact, is both an object of ideal, aesthetic representation, and a subject in 
the process of deep, psycho-physiological and, thus, material transfiguration. As the 
language of “model[ling] vigorously in wax” indicates, and the content of a novel deal-
ing with the “labours of the soul” confirms, Under Western Eyes outlines the “plastic 
shape” of a malleable character, and the impressions he both produces on and receives 
from others (24, 87). Notice that even from this materialist, psychological perspective 
plasticity continues to remain in line with a classical view of character. As Plato had 
made clear in books 2 and 3 of the Republic, ideal forms, or types, do not only give 
form to mimetic “shadows” or “phantoms” far removed from reality to be seen from 
the outside. Rather, for Plato, fictional characters, as they appear in Homer’s Iliad and 
Odyssey for instance, also function as exemplary models that give form to human char-
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a discussion of the educational role of fictional types, which inaugurates Plato’s critique 
of mimesis in the Republic, that Socrates speaks of children’s mimetic tendency to 
emulate literary models in terms of plastic, wax-like characters that are “best molded 
(plattetai) and takes the impression (tupos) that one wishes to stamp upon it” (624).
Plato is fully aware of the plasticity of children’s characters and of the power of cul-
tural types to form them, a plastic realization that, in his view, is far from being limited 
to childhood but continues to inform adulthood as well—hence his delineation of that 
alternative exemplary picture of the body politic, which is the Republic. Closer to the 
moderns, this ancient pedagogical awareness of human plasticity is equally central 
to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an educator of direct Platonic inspiration who, in Émile 
(1762), celebrates the Republic as “the most beautiful treaty on education that has 
ever been written.”14 And on these ancient foundations Rousseau, shifting the terms 
of the discussion from the formation of character (or the soul) to the brain, claims that 
“nature endows the child’s brain with a malleability which renders him able to receive 
all kinds of impressions” (la nature donne au cerveau d’un enfant cette souplesse qui 
le rend propre à recevoir toutes sortes d’impressions)—hence his alternative outline 
of that exemplum of education for adults to read, which is Émile (Émile, 139). Conrad 
tends to be notoriously critical of his literary models, including Dostoevsky (Crime and 
Punishment being a major influence in Under Western Eyes) and Rousseau, and his 
critique increases in direct proportion to the latter’s power of impression.15 And yet, 
as he writes his Russian novel set in Geneva, literally under the shadow of “Rousseau 
seated on its pedestal,” staging a student of philosophy who (Boulevard des Philos-
ophes oblige) is shaped by classical models, he, Conrad, is nonetheless informed by 
this philosophical view of plasticity. Thus, he directly echoes Rousseau as he says: “the 
ancient Greeks understood that [i.e., the formative power of emotional impressions] 
very well” (Under Western Eyes, 226).
More recently, another important echo of this classical view of plasticity can be heard 
in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe’s account of the imitation of the moderns. The Platonic 
language the French philosopher mobilizes in Typography resonates directly with Con-
rad’s initial delineation of Razumov. As he puts it in his commentary on Plato’s Republic: 
“Things, begin then—and this is what ‘imitation’ is all about—with the ‘plastic’ (fash-
ioning, modelling, fictioning) with the impression of the type . . . originally inscribe[d] 
in the malleable—plastic—material of the infant soul” (Typography, 126–27). For 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Conrad, then, just as for Rousseau and Plato before them, 
mimesis and plasticity are two sides of the same coin, and once these sides are joined 
they give form to a Janus-faced “soul.” Far from having only a spiritual, disembodied, 
transcendental side, as well, within this Platonic tradition, the soul also has a plastic, 
material, and thus immanent side, as well, which is best molded by the formative, typo-
graphic power of mimetic impressions. This is why Lacoue-Labarthe, on the shoulders 
of Plato, speaks of subjectivity in terms of a “pure and disquieting plasticity . . . which 
doubtless requires a ‘subjective base’—a ‘wax’—but without any other property than 
an infinite malleability” (115). A plastic view of the subject, understood in its classical 
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indeed internal to a most classical, literary and philosophical definition of mimesis—and 
Conrad knew it. The human character, or soul, has been defined from the beginning of 
philosophy in terms of a wax-like material base that is formed by culture and formative 
of culture—and Conrad knew this as well.
If Razumov functions as an exemplary clinical case study, then, it is because his 
character allows us to diagnose both the formative and the de-formative sides of plas-
ticity. A youth “without a family,” this orphan’s identity is not hardwired in hereditary 
familial dispositions: “no home influences,” we are told, “had shaped his opinions or 
his feelings” (Under Western Eyes, 16). Hence, he is not only “impressionable” and 
without features—a quality he shares with Russian characters depicted in other novels; 
he also relies on his malleable disposition to give form to his character.16 In particular, 
he aspires—via the medium of philosophy—to write a “prize essay” that would gain him 
a “Silver Medal,” attract the attention of the aristocratic father who orphaned him, and 
approximate a “classical correctness of type” (Under Western Eyes, 174, 17, 13). And 
yet, as the narrative unfolds, his philosophical plan backfires. Razumov is implicated in 
an explosive revolutionary bombing in St. Petersburg that disrupts his academic career, 
is subjected by the Russian authorities to playing the role of a double agent in Geneva, 
and, in the process, falls hopelessly in love with the beautiful and trusting Natalia Hal-
din, the “divine” sister of Victor Haldin, the revolutionary student responsible for the 
attack Razumov had betrayed, who now haunts him like a phantom. Unsurprisingly, 
then, the impossible double binds generated by these political, cultural, and above all, 
affective impressions eventually lead to the material disfiguration of Razumov’s mal-
leable character the beginning of the novel had already foreshadowed.
And yet, precisely for this reason, Razumov’s tragic case provides clinically-oriented 
readers with an illuminating case study to diagnose both the idealist and material sides 
that inform Conrad’s account of plasticity. Thus, the teacher of English language who 
frames and narrates the events by reporting, at one remove, the confessions Razumov 
wrote in his diary, speculates, in an idealist mood: “Life is a thing of form. It has its 
plastic shape and a definite intellectual aspect” (87). But as a “man who believes in the 
psychological values of facts,” the narrator immediately sharpens his diagnostic by add-
ing, in a materialist mood: “The most idealistic conceptions of love and forbearance must 
be clothed in flesh as it were before they can be made understandable” (225, 87–88). 
For the narrator, and arguably for Conrad too, the “shape” of psychic life needs to be 
anchored in the materiality of the “flesh” in order to be configured. No matter how 
ideal the “plastic shape” may be in its philosophical aspirations, a diagnostic of the soul 
cannot escape the dissection of the materiality of the flesh in its plastic transformations.
This brief and necessarily partial backward glance to the classical origins of mimetic 
theory in its idealist foundations allows us to better see how Conrad outlines plastic 
paradoxes that are now at the forefront of contemporary discussions in the neurosci-
ences. Neither scientists, nor historians, nor even philosophers, have yet recognized 
that, as a concept, plasticity follows mimesis in its power to generate both good and bad 
impressions. But, this old philosophical lesson casts a long shadow on the paradox that 
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drawing the implications of a number of clinical case studies, writes that “neuroplasti-
city isn’t all good news; it renders our brains not only more resourceful but also more 
vulnerable to outside influences” (The Brain, xx). Along similar lines, Nikolas Rose 
and Joelle M. Abi-Rached articulate the duplicity of neuroplasticity as they remind us 
that “[b]y the close of the twentieth century, the brain had come to be envisioned as 
mutable across the whole of life, open to environmental influences, damaged by insults, 
and nourished and even reshaped by stimulation—in a word plastic” (Neuro, 48). And 
Malabou speaks of plasticity as “situated between two extremes: on the one side the 
sensible image of taking form (sculpture or plastic objects [and ‘docile’ subjects]) and 
on the other side that of the annihilation of all form (explosion [or ‘trauma’])” (What 
Should We Do, 5). Scientists, historians, and philosophers implicitly agree with Conrad 
that plasticity, for better and worse, forces us to rethink what the human subject is—or 
can possibly become.
And yet, the case of this student of philosophy also warns scholars in the humanities 
not to jump on the latest neurological bandwagon without first revisiting the philo-
sophical tradition that informs the double, pharmacological effects of the plasticity of 
subjectivity. Generally, the traces of this tradition have been erased, for this erasure 
is constitutive of the conceptual emergence of plasticity itself. As Malabou puts it, in 
an anti-mimetic mood: “The capacity of each to receive and to create his or her own 
form does not depend on any pre-established form; the original model or standard is, 
in a way, progressively erased” (6). And erasures that apply to the brain are reflected 
in writing as well—or partially so: for the traces of the model’s original impressions 
are still marginally visible in Malabou’s philosophical account of plasticity. Malabou, 
in fact, rightly stresses that unlike “flexibility,” plasticity “has a long philosophical past, 
which has itself remained too long in the shadows” (13). But then why not bring these 
mimetic shadows that implicitly haunt Malabou’s conceptualization of plasticity in 
terms of “impression,” “adaptation,” “formation,” “identification,” “trace,” et cetera 
in the foreground, or, at least mention their genealogy into one of those footnotes her 
mentor, Jacques Derrida, taught her to trace?17 You will have guessed the diagnosis: 
just as there was a pharmacological dimension to mimesis as both poison and cure in 
the past, there is now a pharmacological side of plasticity as the source of revolutionary 
transformations and docile adaptations in the present. If these scientific discoveries are 
empirically new and open up new fields of investigation that root subjectivity back in 
the materiality of the body from which it stems, in their abstract conceptual delinea-
tion neuroplasticity is nothing less and nothing more than the contemporary translation 
of an ancient mimetic pharmakon into the new language of contemporary neurology.
Still, at this stage a lingering objection can no longer be postponed: plasticity may 
well be constitutive of the Conradian account of “character,” or “soul,” but this does 
not mean that this wax-like “material” actually concerns the brain itself. After all, 
psychology, not neurology, is the focus of Conrad’s diagnostic of a “Russian soul” rep-
resentative of what he calls, in his “Notes,” “the psychology of Russia itself” (Under 
Western Eyes, 5). This objection is fully justified. Conrad’s insights into the foundations 
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for their scientific, factual observations. And yet this canonical view that dominated 
first-generation cognitive theories of mind is also in need of a supplement. In fact, 
Conrad’s attention to plasticity allows him to sail past the Scylla of an idealist tradition 
that thinks of the soul in opposition to the brain, and the Charybdis of a materialist 
tradition that reduces the soul to the mere activity of the brain. When it comes to the 
plasticity of character, in fact, clear-cut structural oppositions between psyche and 
soma, matter and spirit, but also self and others, nature and nurture, no longer hold 
in Under Western Eyes. Instead, Conrad introduces fluid, psychosomatic continuities 
that spill over such conceptual divides in order to inform the “plastic shape” of what 
he calls “soul,” or alternatively, “brain.”
Conrad suggests repeatedly in the novel that the psychological states that animate 
Razumov’s mouvements d’âme affect the neurological base of his brain. For instance, 
after Razumov’s brutal beating of a coach-driver called Ziemianitch, we are told that 
“something seemed to turn over in his head bringing upper-most a singularly hard clear 
facet of his brain” (36). A psychological, yet primal emotion such as anger has thus the 
power to turn the structure of the “brain” itself so as to reveal a previously concealed 
“facet”—a preliminary indication that emotions, for Conrad, are ultimately rooted 
in neurological motions. Along similar lines, in order to make clear that the brain is 
not only affected by basic personal emotions such as anger, but also by more complex 
impersonal affects such as horror, the narrator wonders: “What vision of all the hor-
rors that can be seen in his hopeless country had come suddenly to haunt his brain?” 
(153). Horror, then, in this novel, affects the soul as much as the brain, moving fluidly 
between spiritual and bodily matters. This does not mean that the obscure meaning of 
what Conrad enigmatically calls “the horror” can be illuminated by seeing which parts 
of the brain lights up as we read Under Western Eyes or Heart of Darkness. Nor should 
we give Conrad’s use of two different signifiers—one spiritual and psychological, the 
other material and physiological—a scientific value per se. Rather, what is significant 
is that Conrad uses these signifiers interchangeably, suggesting that the distinction 
between psyche and soma, the soul and the brain, the mental facet and its material 
base, breaks down in his diagnostic of the power of impressions on his wax-like mimetic 
subject matter, introducing a fluid continuity between psychic (mental) and physiologi-
cal (neuronal) levels. If a long-standing Cartesian tradition has traditionally thought of 
concepts such as brain and soul in terms of dualistic opposition, and a scientific tradi-
tion thought of the brain as fixed and hardwired, Conrad encourages us to think again. 
His dual approach to the question of plasticity destabilizes the ontological distinction 
between brain and soul (or mind), suggesting not simply that they are two faces of the 
same coin, but that the interface that divides these seemingly opposed facets also con-
nects them, generating a complex, dynamic, and heterogeneous interplay that requires 
more fluid types of interrogations.
Stamped by the press, modeled on types, graven by words and events, the soul-brain 
binary system, in Conrad’s fictions in general and Under Western Eyes in particular, is 
not only the locus of psychic, moral, and political (dis)figurations; it is also the starting 
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following the bombing, diagnoses the paradoxical process that turns a character sub-
jected to formative impressions into a subject who gives form to such impressions, as 
he speculates: “The words and events of that evening must have been graven as if with 
a steel tool on Mr. Razumov’s brain since he was able to write his relation with such 
fullness and precision as a good many months afterwards” (26). Critics have tended to 
be suspicious of mimetic accounts of the tale understood in term of realistic represen-
tation; and rightly so, given the unreliable status of the participant narrator who filters 
the events from a distance. But if this narrative “has not lost all its interest,” as Conrad 
hopes to be the case, it is also because Conrad reframes the ancient paradox of mime-
sis in the new language of plasticity. Brain plasticity is not only the site of damaging 
impressions; it is also at the source of a confessional type of writing that gives artistic 
form to neurological imprints left on the brain. It is, in fact, because “words and events” 
are “graven as if with a steel tool” in the plastic materiality of the “brain” that they are 
permanently inscribed in Razumov’s memory and can, in turn, in-form that “labour of 
the soul” par excellence which is writing—or, as they say in Geneva, écriture.
We are now in a position to fully outline the contours of a conceptual loop that gives 
form to the paradoxical structure of plasticity and to reinscribe it in the pharmacological 
origins from which it emerges. For Conrad, brain plasticity renders the subject both 
passive and active, both vulnerable to the power of impressions that leave traces on the 
brain, and endowed with impressive force to turn these traces into a type of writing that 
gives form to the soul. This double movement is, once again, nothing original. It is but 
an echo of a classical mimetic principle that can be traced from Rousseau all the way 
back to Plato. As Derrida famously suggests in “Plato’s Pharmacy,” “mimesis” is a concept 
with a “malleable unity” and directly in-forms writing, including inscriptions in memory 
(77). As he puts it, “the pharmakon of writing is good for hypomnesis (re-memoration, 
recollection, consignation)” as it mimetically reproduces “copies, accounts, tales, lists, 
notes, duplicates, chronicles, genealogies” (95, 109). And Derrida’s diagnostic cuts 
deeper as he specifies: “The imprints (tupoi) of writing inscribe themselves . . . in the 
wax of the soul in intaglio, thus corresponding to the spontaneous, autochthonous mo-
tions of psychic life” (107). Since plasticity is a paradoxical concept that transgresses the 
line between active and passive, nature and culture, poisonous effects and therapeutic 
cures, it is thus no wonder that what Derrida says of mimesis in the case of Rousseau 
(and Plato) equally applies to plasticity in the case of Malabou. Both concepts, in fact, 
make us see that “supplementation [suppléance] has always already begun, that imita-
tion, principle of art, has always already interrupted natural plenitude, that having to 
be a discourse, it has always already broached presence in difference; that in Nature it 
is always what supplies nature’s lack” (Derrida, Of Grammatology, 234). As a coda to 
this long phrase let us echo a brief mimetic supplement: plasticity is in Nature what 
supplies, by way of imitation, principle of art, Nature’s lack.
Plasticity, then, mimes the pharmacological structure of writing and adds a materi-
alist supplement to a (post)structuralist ontology perhaps excessively concerned with 
linguistic play. Yet, by inscribing physio-psychological traces in the brain itself, the case 
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that “the specificity of writing would thus be intimately bound to the absence of the fa-
ther” (Derrida, “Plato’s Pharmacy,” 82). That is, an absence which informs what Derrida 
calls the “distress of the orphan” (the case of Razumov) while at the same time opening 
up the liberating possibility of becoming “a vagrant, an adventurer” via the medium 
of writing (the case of Conrad) (82, 144). I thus let go of Conrad’s fictional account 
of plasticity in order to cast a diagnostic look upon his autobiographical confessions.
Plastic Transformations: The Orphan as Artist
Conrad’s account of his “still plastic character” in the “Author’s Note” of A Personal 
Record is framed within a larger discussion concerning his linguistic “adoption” and 
artistic birth—a confirmation that the adventure of writing, for Conrad too, cannot 
be dissociated from the distress of the orphan, and that an underlying theoretical 
continuity ties Under Western Eyes to his autobiographical memoir, or as Christopher 
GoGwilt calls it, “supplement.”18 At first sight, Conrad’s view of language and the model 
of artistic creation that informs it is far from original. Denying any “act of deliberate 
volition” as well as any conscious “choice” in the “adoption” of English as a medium, 
Conrad qualifies his aesthetic education as follows: “yes, there was adoption; but it 
was I who was adopted by the genius of the language” (Personal Record, v). Conrad, 
the son of anti-Russian revolutionaries who died early in his youth, puts himself in the 
position of an orphan when it comes to his linguistic and, thus, artistic birth: a vulner-
able, passive position that seemingly deprives him of agency, volition, and conscious 
control over the choice of his artistic medium. Just as an orphaned child cannot choose 
his adoptive parents, the analogy suggests, so the multilingual artist cannot choose his 
adoptive language. Instead, as Geoffrey Harpham puts it, adoption “requires assent” 
in the sense that the orphan must make himself receptive to the possibility of such 
an adoption (Conrad in the Twenty-first Century, 22). This is, to be sure, a humble 
rhetorical move that reduces the subject of speech (subjective genitive) to a subject of 
speech (objective genitive). And yet, as we have learned to see, it is a move that cuts 
both ways. The orphan may be dispossessed of what is proper to him for his character 
is not impressed by formative “influences” hardwired in the brain, but for this very 
same reasons, he can also be possessed by superior linguistic-neurological forces that 
are not deprived of what he calls “genius.”
Now, if the case of Razumov suggested that plasticity at the level of the brain is 
necessary to record the traces of personal impressions inscribed in memory, the case of 
the artist as orphan implies that plasticity at the level of language is essential to render 
these impressions in aesthetic terms. In this double sense, Conrad’s choice of English 
over French as a medium of expression is revealing of the underlying linguistic foun-
dations that in-form Conrad’s plastic transformation. As he explains, familiarity with 
a specific language from infancy is not always an advantage if one aspires, as he does, 
to a plastic use of the medium: “[T]hough I knew French fairly well and was familiar 
with it from infancy,” writes Conrad, “I would have been afraid to attempt expression 
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objection to French does not concern sound or lexicon but structure and form. Since 
French syntactical and grammatical structures, he seems to suggest (and the Académie 
Française confirms it) tend to remain perfectly rigid over time, Conrad’s artistic impres-
sion is that these linguistic forms, precisely because of their crystallized structures, do 
not allow for the necessary plasticity necessary to mediate the fluidity of the “respon-
sive emotions” so central to his impressionist, early-modernist poetics (“Preface,” xiii). 
Despite his admiration of French masters of style, such as Flaubert and Maupassant, 
Conrad considers French linguistic structures inimical to the plasticity of the subject 
matter he aims to convert into phrases. More precisely, Conrad stresses that artistic 
creation is not a question of expressing thoughts or emotions so as to fit preexisting 
linguistic structures—no matter how perfect and luminous these forms are. Rather, for 
Conrad, it is a matter of rendering sense-impressions through a medium plastic enough 
to capture the flux of affects—no matter how dark and formless these affects may be. 
This is perhaps why Conrad says in his famous “Preface” that art should aspire to “the 
plasticity of sculpture” in order to achieve the “perfect blending of form and substance” 
the orphan as artist aspires to (xiii). The conflict between French and English is thus 
not simply linguistic or cultural, but aesthetic and ontological. The former entails the 
ideal expression through the medium of “crystallized” forms, the latter is based on a 
material impression through the medium of “plastic” forms; the former presupposes a 
formed subject who can express himself through the structure of language, the latter 
presupposes a formless subject who can be impressed by the power of affects; the former 
rests on an ontology of being, the latter promotes an ontology becoming. In short, the 
impressionistic medium is mimetic in the sense that it blends in—chameleon-like—with 
the psychosomatic impressions that inform Conrad’s artistic message.19
Conversely, plasticity for Conrad is not only formative of aesthetic impressions rep-
resented in his fictions, but also of psychic impressions felt by his own plastic character. 
That Conrad’s linguistic formation and his personal formation are deeply interconnected 
was already indicated by the language of “adoption” he convokes. But an orphan is not 
only in search of a language; he is above all in search of an identity. And it is precisely 
this lack of restricted familial influences that renders the orphan particularly open to 
more general cultural adoptions. Conrad, in fact, anchors his view of artistic creation in 
material, natural dispositions along lines that complicate, once again, structural binaries 
that oppose nature to nurture, biological to artistic birth. Thus he says, “The truth of 
the matter is that my faculty to write in English is as natural as any other aptitude with 
which I might have been born. I have a strange and overpowering feeling that it had 
always been an inherent part of myself” (Personal Record, 4–5). Despite his cultural 
“adoption,” Conrad now suggests that a cultural acquisition as sophisticated as creative 
writing in a language twice-removed from his linguistic origins is rooted in aptitudes 
he considers “natural,” that is, present from “birth” and, thus, “inherent” to the sub-
ject. This seemingly contradictory passage has puzzled some of Conrad’s most astute 
commentators; yet it can be easily resolved if we notice that Conrad is not speaking of 
English itself, but of his “faculty to write in English” and, above all, specifies that this 
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possible what he calls “any other aptitude with which [he] might have been born.”20 
That plasticity plays a decisive role in this so-called “natural” faculty present from birth 
and constitutive of Conrad’s protean “aptitudes” is suggested a few lines below as he 
clarifies that this belated linguistic adoption was made possible thanks to what he calls 
his “still plastic character.”21 
The adverb “still” to define the plasticity of a man in his mid-thirties clearly indicates 
that Conrad, the artist who “descends within himself” in order to tap into his “less 
obvious capacities,” senses with the antennae of a modernist soul rendered receptive 
by his constant need of adaptation that what we have seen him call character, soul, or 
alternatively, brain, was not only born plastic, but continued to remain plastic throughout 
his life (“Preface,” xii). Further, Conrad suggests that it is this plastic malleability rooted 
in his “nature” that allowed him to be successfully adopted by the English language. 
Though he will always speak English with a thick Polish accent that marked the limits of 
plasticity, he will master it in writing in such a way that few native speakers born directly 
into it will ever do. Plasticity may thus well account for what Ford Madox Ford called 
Conrad’s “marvellous resilience,” but more importantly it indicates that, for Conrad, 
it is the very medium that allowed for his belated artistic formation. The genius of the 
language does not precede Conrad’s natural plasticity.22 Rather, it is plasticity that makes 
a genial linguistic assimilation possible.
In a sense then, what was true for Razumov in fiction is equally true for Conrad 
in life. If Conrad’s so-called “plasticity” was decisive in forming his artistic character, 
providing the natural base for the growth of this cultural faculty, Conrad also speci-
fies that this cultural faculty retroacts, via a feedback loop, on the material base of his 
character, thereby reforming its still plastic brain. Having identified all the elements 
of this artistic transformation, let us step back and retrace the loop at play in this most 
informative paragraph in its complete form:
The truth of the matter is that my faculty to write in English is as natural as any other 
aptitude with which I might have been born. I have a strange and overpowering feeling 
that it had always been an inherent part of myself. English was for me neither a matter 
of choice nor adoption. The merest idea of choice had never entered my head. And as 
to adoption—well, yes, there was adoption; but it was I who was adopted by the genius 
of the language, which directly I came out of the stammering stage made me its own so 
completely that its very idioms I truly believe had a direct action on my temperament and 
fashioned my still plastic character. (Personal Record, 4–5)
These lines have received much critical attention but the theoretical insights inherent 
in Conrad’s account of plasticity are still in need of delineation. It is not simply a ques-
tion of realizing that the genius of the language speaks through Conrad, in a mimetic 
way, that is, by divine inspiration, or enthusiasm—as Plato or the Romantics thought. 
Nor is this a re-enactment of the myth that language speaks us, ça parle, in a symbolic 
way—as some French (post)structuralists thought. Rather, Conrad has a more nuanced, 
duplicitous, and ultimately hypermimetic diagnostic in mind: namely, that “plasticity” 
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of a spiraling process that is both active and passive, natural and cultural, fictive and 
real, pathological and patho-logical, and—supplementing a purely linguistic principle—
leaves immanent, material, physio-psychological impressions behind. If we were to 
stop the spiraling circulation of this process so as to individuate the double movement 
simultaneously at play in the interface of Conrad’s soul-brain, two rotating faces ap-
pear. On the one hand, plasticity is a natural, neurological base that is responsible for 
Conrad’s penchant for chameleon-like adaptations, including the aptitude to write in 
English. In this sense, plasticity is not only responsible for bringing a linguistic subject 
into being; it is also the inspirational source of what used to be called Conrad’s linguistic 
genius. On the other hand, in his genial use of an elastic language such as English, this 
mimetic faculty turns upon itself and retroacts, via a feedback loop, on the speaking, 
writing, and above all, living subject itself, “fashioning” his “still plastic character.” In 
this sense, plasticity entails a process of impressionistic formation characteristic of the 
orphan as artist.
Plasticity is not a minor topic in Conrad’s corpus; it is the very medium for its for-
mation. It is thus not surprising that in his fictions, Conrad repeatedly pushes plastic 
principles beyond clear-cut oppositions between good and evil impressions, but also the 
mind and the brain, thought and body, reason and instinct, in order to think through the 
power of the mind to re-form the very structure of the brain. If Under Western Eyes 
is perhaps his most incisive articulation of the conceptual and affective foundations of 
plasticity, a lesser-known tale titled “The Duel,” articulates the possible destinations of 
neuroaesthetic insights with which I would like to conclude. 
In a crucial passage in which the character’s actions depart from automatic, instinctual 
reactions, Conrad suggests this line of inquiry: “it may be an inquiry worth pursuing 
whether in reflective mankind the mechanical promptings of instinct are not affected 
by the customary mode of thought.”23 And giving diagnostic substance to this claim, he 
adds: an “idea, afterward restated, defended and developed in many discussions, had 
settled into one of the stock notions of his brain, became a part of his mental individu-
ality” (The Duel, 255, my emphasis). Such a diagnostic inquiry into the working of the 
mind is, indeed, a neuroplastic inquiry in the plasticity of the brain; it breaks down the 
mind-brain divide, generating a formative feedback loop we have been tracing all along. 
Conrad, in fact, speculates that plasticity makes us pliable to cultural “ideas” that, if 
repeated, settle into the “brain,” reforming not only reason, but “instinct” itself. Hence, 
for Conrad ideas that used to be confined on the side of the mind (or culture) have 
the power to retroact on the plasticity of the brain (or nature) and reform characters 
so profoundly that they transform human instincts. 
This idea looks back to the origins of philosophy but also looks ahead to recent sci-
entific discoveries. At the end of his account of neuroplasticity, Doidge marvels about 
“how truly integrated imagination and action are, despite the fact that we tend to think 
of imagination and action as completely different and subject to different rules” and 
concludes by supporting Conrad’s neuroplastic hypothesis as he says that “our ‘immate-
rial’ thoughts have a physical signature” (The Brain that Changes Itself, 207, 214). At the 
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scientific community. As Schwartz, one of the early supporters of neuroplasticity, puts 
it: “Since I was arguing that the mind can change the brain, persuading the scientific 
community that I was right required that scientists accept an even more basic fact: 
that the adult brain can change at all” (The Mind, 15). Conrad modestly called this “an 
inquiry worth pursuing.” Doidge does not hesitate to call this realization “surely one 
of the most extraordinary discoveries of the twentieth century” (The Brain, xix). And 
quite rightly so; if the neuronal structure of the brain turns out to be shaped, molded, 
and impressed by exterior influences, then, there are major scientific and theoretical 
implications for what we could possibly do with our brain.
As the humanities and the neurosciences join arms to think about what humans could 
possibly become in an age that is likely to require increasing capacities for adaptation, 
it might be worth returning to literature in general and Conrad’s writings in particular 
for artistic inspiration. At least this Janus-faced perspective would remind us that the 
brain does not “change itself”—it is changed by culture.
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